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Abstract 
In emerging markets, the concentration of corporate ownership has created 
agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders, which 
are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such 
as boards of directors and takeovers. This study examines whether external 
independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding 
mechanisms to alleviate these agency conflicts. Using a broad sample of firms 
from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms are more likely to 
employ Big Five auditors when they are subject to the agency problem imbedded 
in their ownership structure. In addition, among East Asian auditees subject to 
the agency problem, Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower 
audit modification threshold while non-Big Five auditors do not. Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that Big Five auditors in emerging markets do have a 
corporate governance role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their typical 
concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that 
allows controlling owners' self-interested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards 
of directors or externally by takeover markets. Moreover, the controlling owners often leverage 
their control by means of stock pyramids and cross shareholdings.1 This separation of control 
(voting rights) from ownership (cash flow rights) further increases the controlling owners' 
incentives to hold up minority shareholders. However, the companies and the controlling 
owners ultimately have to bear the agency cost as their shares would be traded at discount, 
reflecting outside investors' anticipation of the entrenchment problem (Claessens et al., 
forthcoming; La Porta et al., forthcoming). This agency problem could even hinder the 
development of capital markets; the agency problem is reported by Johnson et al. (2000), 
Mitton (2000) and Lemmon and Lins (2001) to be a key factor in exacerbating the stock 
market declines in East Asia during the 1997 financial crisis. 
Since that financial crisis, East Asian governments and international organizations (the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund) have made efforts to reform corporate governance 
and enhance the accountability of corporations. In this paper, we investigate whether 
independent external auditors in East Asia can serve a corporate governance role by assuring 
the quality of accounting information. We focus on the auditors' role in safeguarding accounting 
information, because correct accounting information endorsed by reputable auditors can be 
served as a critical governance constraint that limits controlling owners' abilities to hold up 
minority shareholders. On the contrary, if the auditors fail to perform such a role, the controlling 
owners would have a higher degree of freedom to manipulate accounting information to 
cover up their self-dealings. 
Theory suggests that entrepreneurs requiring external capital would have incentives to mitigate 
their agency problems by introducing monitoring and/or bonding mechanisms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). They would voluntarily tie their hands when the expected benefit from 
external financing exceeds the expected gain from expropriating outside investors. In 
particular, the entrepreneurs may voluntarily employ reputable intermediaries to assure outside 
investors of the credibility of the accounting information. The appointment of quality auditors 
serves as an assurance to the investors that the companies' financial disclosures are accurate 
and truthful. The assurance is credible because the auditors, with their reputations at stake, 
will closely scrutinize their clients' books and truthfully disclose their findings. Prior research 
has documented that auditors do fulfill such an assurance role in the U.S. (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). However, there is very little research that examines whether or not external 
auditors fulfill such a role in emerging markets. 
Even without research on this topic, there has been debate on whether or not East Asian 
auditors in practice fulfill the quality assurance role and hence mitigate the agency problem. 
On the one hand, compared with external auditors in the U.S. and U.K., auditors in East Asia 
potentially have a stronger governance role because the conventional corporate control 
systems such as boards of directors and takeover markets are weaker in protecting investors. 
1
 There is a growing body of literature documenting that the separation of ownership and control is common among 
public corporations around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) report such evidence from more than 600 corporations in 
27 developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) report similar evidence for East Asian firms. 
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In the presence of Big Five accounting firms, East Asian economies can tap into an 
international pool of quality auditors. In contrast, the supply of independent directors is only 
found locally. Also, the entry of international accounting firms has made the market for external 
auditors vibrant, while the market for takeovers remains stagnant in East Asia. On the other 
hand, as will be discussed further in the next section, the relationship-based transactions, 
the weak legal environment and the under-development of the domestic accounting profession 
in East Asia may have considerably reduced the demand and supply of quality audits in the 
region. Evidence in a United Nations report (Rahman, 1999) leads to questions about the 
monitoring role of East Asian external auditors. The report queries why, at the onset of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, many external auditors had issued clean auditing opinions to firms 
that went bankrupt within a few months after the completion of the audits. 
To test whether or not external auditors perform a governance role, we use a broad sample 
of East Asian firms to examine first if firms that are subject to more agency conflicts hire 
"name-brand" (Big Five) auditors. Big Five auditors have international reputations and are 
generally perceived to be more independent than are local auditors.2 If Big Five auditors 
provide better quality assurance, the demand for their services should increase in response 
to clients' agency problems. In contrast, the opposing hypothesis suggests that a firm's 
choice of auditor is insensitive to its agency problems; a firm may even avoid hiring a Big 
Five auditor to reduce external monitoring. 
To further examine whether or not East Asian auditors help to mitigate agency conflicts, we 
investigate if they take into account firms' agency conflicts when making audit pricing and 
audit opinion decisions. If auditors provide assurance of quality through their superior 
reputations or if they exert efforts to mitigate agency conflicts, these additional services 
would be reflected in the audit fee. Thus, we test if, ceteris paribus, auditors charge a premium 
in response to agency problems. Finally, we test if poor earnings would more likely trigger 
East Asian auditors to issue modified opinions to firms subject to large agency problems 
than to those subject to small agency problems. The loss exposure associated with firms' 
agency problems per se may not be high, but it will be magnified when the firms are in 
financial distress. Auditors may raise their doubt about their clients' accounting because 
when these firms approach their terminal years, the entrenched owners have more incentives 
to expropriate outside shareholders. Also, the controlling owner entrenchment may reduce 
firm performance and the audit clients' ability to survive the financial crisis. Thus, to poorly 
performing clients, auditors will respond to the increased risk exposure by giving more modified 
opinions to clients with large agency problems. 
To proxy for the extent of the agency problem in East Asian firms, we focus on the 
entrenchment of the controlling owners. In particular, we use the controlling owner's control 
level and the extent to which the control exceeds the actual corresponding portion of 
ownership. We expect that the most serious agency problems will occur among firms whose 
owners possess high degrees of control but own only small stakes in the firms. 
2
 Prior research such as Teoh and Wong (1993) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) has documented using U.S. data 
that Big Five auditors provide better quality service than do non-Big Five auditors. In Asia, there is very little research 
providing direct evidence that Big Five auditors are superior. However, several studies, such as Simon, Ramanan, and 
Dugar (1986), Simon, Teo, and Trompeter (1992), and DeFond, Francis, and Wong (2000), have documented the 
existence of a Big Five brand-name fee premium in Hong Kong, Singapore and India, which is consistent with prior 
research on U.S. firms that Big Five auditors are quality-differentiated from non-Big Five auditors in these Asian countries. 
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Our overall results suggest that external auditors do perform a governance role in East Asia. 
In the choice of auditors, we find that firms are more likely to hire Big Five auditors when their 
ownership structures indicate agency conflicts, i.e., when their ultimate owners possess 
high control but own only small stakes in the firms. Further tests reveal that the relation 
between auditor choice and ownership structure exists among small and high-leverage firms 
whose controlling owner entrenchment problem is likely to be magnified by their higher risk, 
but not among large and low-leverage firms whose controlling owner entrenchment problem 
is likely be less acute. Our results also show that Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and 
set a lower audit modification threshold for auditees with larger agency problems, while non-
Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors charge a fee premium to clients 
with high control concentrations and a large divergence between control and ownership. 
Also, we document that poor earnings are more likely to trigger modified opinions for Big 
Five clients with larger agency problems than those with less severe agency problems. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that, in East Asia, the Big Five auditors indeed have monitoring 
and bonding effects as predicted by the agency theory. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, discusses the two competing 
views about the governance role of auditors in East Asia, and presents our hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the sample data and Section 4 reports the empirical analyses. In Section 
5, we conclude the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
In this section we review the literature on auditors' roles in corporate governance. We discuss 
two competing views regarding whether or not independent external auditors serve in a 
governance role in East Asia. We develop several hypotheses pertaining to how auditor 
choice, audit fee, and audit opinion might reflect East Asian firms' agency problems imbedded 
in their ownership structures. 
The positive view 
Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that publicly reported accounting information, which 
measures a firm's financial position and performance, can be used as important input 
information in various corporate governance mechanisms such as managerial incentive plans 
and monitoring by directors, outside shareholders and debtholders. However, whether and 
how reported accounting information is used in the governance of a firm depends on the 
quality and credibility of such information. External auditors can potentially play an important 
corporate governance role by providing assurance of the quality of publicly reported accounting 
information. 
The governance role of employing external audits to ensure accounting information quality 
has been more extensively discussed in the Securities Exchange Commission's (1999) 
pronouncement on Audit Committee Disclosure. This pronouncement suggests that managers 
of firms with weak corporate governance are less restrained from engaging in opportunistic 
earnings management activities such as manipulating earnings to meet profit targets in their 
compensation contracts (Healy, 1985). Recent academic research has also documented 
that earnings management activities are negatively associated with board independence 
(Klein, 2000b and Peasnell et al., 2000) and the choice of Big Five auditors (Becker et al., 
1998). 
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Studying the governance role of external auditors in restraining the opportunistic behaviors 
of managers is not new in academic research. There has been a long-standing interest in 
the accounting and finance literatures in examining how firms employ monitors and bonding 
mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts between firm managers and outside shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Titman and Trueman (1986) use a theoretical model to illustrate 
that an entrepreneur that has decided to take his/her firm public can choose a higher-quality 
auditor or investment banker to provide investors with information about the firm's true value. 
Disciplining managers by employing independent auditors to assure information quality is 
not a modern idea either. Using a historical perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) 
document that independent audits were demanded since the days of English merchant guilds 
in the eleventh century to the time when audits were required by law in the twentieth century. 
Not only is an external audit valued and thus demanded in the absence of law, there is 
evidence that firms with agency problems are more likely to demand external audits. For 
example, Chow (1982) uses a sample of U.S. companies from the 1926 Poor's Industrial 
Manual and documents that large firms with high debt-equity ratios and many accounting-
based debt covenants are more likely to hire external auditors. 
There have been several U.S. studies that examine auditor choice and the agency problem 
in more recent periods when external audits were required by law (Palmrose, 1984; Simunic 
and Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Eichenseher and Shield, 1989; DeFond, 1992). 
The common theme of these studies is the linking of auditor choice or switches with the level 
and/or changes in firm size, leverage and management ownership. These studies find that 
large firms hire large and/or name-brand auditors. They do not provide significant and 
consistent evidence that a firm's auditor choice is related to agency problems as measured 
by management ownership and leverage. Most of the prior studies do not find any significant 
relation between auditor choice and the agency variables (see Table 1 in DeFond, 1992), 
and some studies even document results in the opposite direction to the agency hypothesis.3 
3
 However, Deli and Gillan (2000) report that the agency problem is relevant in the composition of audit committees in 
boards of directors. They find that the likelihood of a firm having a fully independent and active audit committee is 
negatively related to managerial ownership and positively related to leverage. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Firms That Hire Big Five or Big Five-Affiliated 
Auditors by Economy and by Year3 
Economy 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
All Economies 
1994-1996b 
80.6 (525)c 
87.7(271) 
74.0 (304) 
62.3(127) 
88.3 (362) 
71.4(422) 
56.1 (125) 
65.3 (209) 
75.2 (2,345) 
1994 
80.0(100) 
84.2 (64) 
79.4 (73) 
19.2(9) 
85.5(71) 
72.0(136) 
54.8 (34) 
59.3(51) 
70.2 (538) 
1995 
78.5 (208) 
86.3 (88) 
71.7(104) 
61.8(47) 
88.8 (142) 
72.1 (119) 
54.4 (43) 
65.5 (76) 
74.6 (827) 
1996 
83.1 (217) 
90.8(119) 
73.0(127) 
87.7(71) 
89.2 (149) 
70.5(167) 
58.5 (48) 
69.5 (82) 
78.3 (980) 
Sample: The sample consists of 3,119 firm-year observations (Big Five and non-Big Five client firms 
combined) from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. The auditor identities of the sample firms in these eight economies from 1994 to 1996 are 
obtained from Worldscope. 
a
 The percentage of firms that hire Big Five or Big Five-affiliated auditors is calculated based on the 
number of firm-years that hire Big Five or Big Five affiliate auditors divided by the number of firm-years 
in the sample for the corresponding economy and year or years. 
b
 Pooled sample of data from 1994 to 1996. The other columns are based on sub-samples of each of the 
three years. 
c
 The numbers of firm-year observations that are clients of Big Five or Big Five-affiliated auditors are in 
brackets. 
One possible explanation for the lack of significant and consistent evidence detailing a relation 
between the agency problem and auditor choice in these prior studies is that the management 
ownership level of the U.S. firms is generally low and the variation in the separation of 
ownership and control is much more significant in East Asian countries (Claessens et al., 
2000). Another reason could be that a wide spectrum of corporate governance mechanisms 
exist in the U.S. that could be employed to alleviate agency conflicts. The idea that other 
governance mechanisms can serve as substitutes for external auditing is consistent with the 
assertion of the U.S. Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees that auditing is but one piece of the firm's overall corporate governance. 
Also, Klein (2000a) empirically documents that firms' audit committee independence is 
negatively associated with their choice of other corporate governance mechanisms. 
In contrast with U.S. and U.K. corporations that are typically diffusely owned, the ownership 
and control of corporations is concentrated in East Asia. When ownership is diffuse as in the 
U.S. and the U.K., agency problems stem from conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. As ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains 
effective control of the firm, as is the case of East Asia, the nature of agency problems shifts 
away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and 
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The majority shareholders' ability to 
effectively control the firm has made conventional corporate governance mechanisms such 
as corporate takeovers and boards of directors ineffective in containing these controlling 
owners' self-interested activities. The monitoring role of independent directors has been 
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ineffective due to the lack of supply of qualified directors in these economies. The market of 
independent directors has yet to develop because, traditionally, controlling owners expect to 
hire directors to work for them, not for the outside shareholders. The external audit market, 
however, is much more developed in East Asia because of the statutory audit requirement 
for publicly listed firms. Independent external auditors, especially with the entry of Big Five 
firms that follow international auditing practice and draw on expertise internationally, could 
fill this void in corporate governance and serve as credible monitors of the controlling 
shareholders. In East Asia, external auditors could perform the corporate governance role 
through limiting the controlling shareholders' ability to manipulate accounting information 
and hence their ability to extract wealth from outside shareholders. For instance, an auditor 
would note when the controlling owner manages earnings downward to justify the low cash 
dividends paid to outside shareholders or when the controlling owner profits from transactions 
with the firm he/she controls by manipulating accounting numbers to influence the selling or 
purchase price. Also, many of these transactions are done through a related party. Increasing 
the disclosure level of related-party activities could discourage such self-dealing activities. A 
typical case is discussed in a recent Asian Wall Street Journal (June 13, 2001) article 
concerning how the controlling owner of a Korean conglomerate issued small cash dividends 
and profited from related-party transactions, while the minority shareholders were calling for 
an extraordinary general meeting to elect an outside independent auditor to monitor the 
controlling owner. 
The corporate governance role of external auditors is frequently discussed in many recent 
publications by regulators and practitioners in East Asia. For instance, the Securities Exchange 
Commission of Thailand Corporate Governance Report (1999) argues that transparency is 
one of the most important aspects of good corporate governance since it allows shareholders 
to use the disclosed information to monitor the performance of the management. Thus, external 
auditors could play an important corporate governance role by providing assurance to the 
accuracy and reliability of financial statements of listed companies. Other publications such 
as the Asian Corporate Governance Association research report (2000), Corporate 
Governance 1999 Survey of Institutional Investors by PricewaterhouseCoopers of Singapore 
(1999), and the Korean Committee on Corporate Governance report (1999) also highlight 
the importance of corporate disclosure and transparency, and the role of external auditing as 
part of good corporate governance practice. 
The negative view 
We have discussed the positive view that auditors in East Asia could provide quality assurance 
of accounting information and hence help to mitigate agency conflicts. On the other hand, a 
negative view suggests that the lack of market demand for and the auditors' willingness to 
supply quality audits may render it impossible for external auditors to be effective monitors. 
On the demand side, controlling owners may not desire to hire high-quality auditors or they 
even hire low-quality auditors to reduce external monitoring. Backman (1999) argues that 
auditing runs against the general culture in Asia where business transactions are relationship 
based. The idea of needing to monitor and to double-check a company's accounts implies 
distrust and may lead to open confrontation between owners and investors. Also, political 
rent seeking is prevalent and highly lucrative in East Asia. Firms in this region may choose to 
remain opaque in order to prevent competition and/or social sanctions. Even if minority 
shareholders demand high-quality external audits, they can always be out-voted by the 
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controlling owner.4 In addition, investors may question the value of external audits because 
the rendered opinions by the auditors often do not result in appropriate legal sanctions on 
firms in emerging markets where law enforcement is weak. Choi and Wong (2002) and 
Francis et al. (2002) also find evidence suggesting that the demand for high quality external 
audits by Big Five firms is significantly lower in countries with weak legal environments. On 
the supply side, the lack of audit expertise and of experienced professionals in the local 
auditing profession weakens auditors' ability to serve as effective monitors.5 Also, there is a 
growing concern in the market that auditors' monitoring role may be in conflict with their 
consulting activities with client firms, an issue not unique to Asia. There has been a growing 
concern that the lack of disciplinary mechanisms in the auditing profession may have 
weakened the independence of auditors in Asia.6 
Consistent with this view, DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000) find that as the Chinese government 
made efforts to improve auditor independence, domestic firms listed in China took flight from 
high-quality to low-quality auditors. They document that, in 1996, the percentage of modified 
opinions increased by nine fold after the promulgation of new auditing standards to improve 
audit quality. However, as audit firms toughen their standards, those that provided high-
quality monitoring services lost market share to low-quality audit firms. 
Ownership structure as a proxy for agency conflicts 
We use the ownership characteristics of the East Asian firms to capture empirically the extents 
of their agency problems. Specifically, after obtaining effective control7 of a firm, the controlling 
owner can determine the profit distribution and opportunistically deprive minority shareholders 
of their rights to share profits. In addition, the controlling owner often secures effective control 
of the firm through complicated stock pyramids and cross shareholdings. These arrangements 
enable the controlling owner to command a given level of control while committing a less-
than-equivalent ownership share. This separation of control and ownership allows the 
controlling owner to extract wealth from the firm, receive the entire benefit, but only bear a 
small fraction of the cost than when there is no separation of control and ownership. We 
4
 The audit committees in East Asian corporations are either non-existent or ineffective, which leaves minority 
shareholders' interests unprotected. In East Asia, only Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia view audit committees as 
a feature of good corporate governance for publicly listed companies. Even if audit committees exist, they often fail to 
represent the interests of minority shareholders because controlling owners are likely to dominate these committees. 
5
 The number of CPAs (certified public accountants) and/or CAs (chartered accountants) as a percentage of the 
population is low among East Asian countries compared with the U.S. (0.1%), Canada (0.3%), and Australia (0.6%). 
Except for Hong Kong (0.2%) and Singapore (0.2%), most other East Asian countries such as Korea (0.01%), Indonesia 
(0.006%), Malaysia (0.07%), the Philippines (0.02%), and Thailand (0.008%) are significantly below the standards of 
developed economies in regards to the numbers of CPAs and CAs. Schipper (2000) argues that the lack of expertise 
and professionalism greatly limit the quality of auditors in developing economies. 
6
 In economies such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, there have been questions concerning the effectiveness of self-
regulation of the accounting profession in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis (The Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
April 22, 1999; New Straits Times Press, February 16, 1997). Even in places such as Thailand, where the accounting 
profession is regulated by the government, there have been government reports admitting that the monitoring efforts 
are inadequate (Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand, 1999). 
7
 The effective control level is likely affected by the distribution of voting rights, which is, in turn, affected by laws, 
corporate charters, and ownership dispersion. The level therefore varies across firms and economies. However, 
Bradley and Kim (1985) show that tender offers are rare when incumbent owners possess more than 20 percent of the 
voting power. 
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offer a simple example to illustrate this point.8 A family firm owns 50% of Company A and is 
considering buying 20% of Company B. To save capital funds, the family firm can exercise 
its control power to make Company A buy 20% of Company B. This way, the family firm only 
bears half of the purchase cost through its 50% ownership in Company A, while the other 
half is borne by the outside shareholders of Company A. Comparing to having the family firm 
investing directly into Company A and B separately, which is the typical horizontal corporate 
structure, this chain of ownership from the family firm to Company A and then to Company B 
is termed the pyramid ownership structure. As a conservative measure, we say that the 
family firm controls 20% of the voting power in Company B, which is the weakest link in this 
chain of control rights in the pyramid. However, the family owns only 10% of the cash flow 
rights of Company B, which is the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. This 
separation of ownership and control under the pyramid structure exacerbates the agency 
problem in Company B because every dollar stolen from it costs the family firm only 10 
cents. Under the horizontal ownership structure, it would cost the family firm"more (20 cents) 
to steal from Company B and the family firm's control level equals its ownership level at 20%. 
Thus, the controlling owner's incentive to expropriate is expected to increase with the degree 
of the divergence between the control and the ownership.9 
Hypotheses 
The above discussion suggests that external auditors may or may not fulfill a corporate 
governance role in East Asia. On the one hand, East Asian auditors may play a more significant 
governance role, as there are fewer conventional corporate control mechanisms available. 
On the other hand, the institutional environment and the concentrated corporate ownership 
structure in East Asia may reduce the demand and supply of quality audits, and weaken the 
governance role of external auditors. To address this question empirically, we first test if 
firms with large agency problems, proxied by their controlling owners' level of voting rights 
compared with the owners' cash flow rights, would have a larger demand for name-brand 
(Big Five) auditors who have international reputations and are generally perceived to be 
more independent. Our formal (alternative) hypothesis is: 
H1: A firm's decision to hire a Big Five auditing firm is positively related to its ultimate owner's 
ability to obtain effective control and/or the degree to which the control exceeds ownership. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it will mean that controlling owners who experience 
agency conflicts may actually not always hire or may even avoid Big Five auditors to evade 
monitoring. 
In addition to examining how agency problems affect firms' choice of auditors in East Asia, 
we perform two tests of whether external auditors play a proactive role in monitoring firms 
with agency problems. In particular, we examine whether agency problems affect East Asian 
auditors' pricing and opinion decisions. In the audit pricing analysis, we examine if auditors 
8
 More detailed pyramid examples using actual corporate groups in East Asia are available in Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000). 
9
 Several recent studies have suggested that these ownership characteristics reasonably capture the agency problem 
in East Asia. Claessens et al. (2000a) report that the divergence between control and ownership rights reduces the 
value of East Asian firms, which is consistent with the existence of the agency problem. Fan and Wong (2001) report 
that the credibility of East Asian firms' accounting information decreases with agency conflicts as captured by the firms' 
ultimate owners' control level and the divergence between their control and ownership rights. 
i 
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charge a fee premium for their clients' agency problems. Again, we use controlling owners' 
level of ownership concentration and the degree of separation of ownership and control as a 
proxy for the degree of agency problems. In an organization that ownership is concentrated, 
major decision rights remain in the hands of a few individuals, typically members of the same 
family. Under such organization structure, there is usually not enough separation of duties 
and independent check and balance mechanisms to restrain the abuse of power by the 
controlling owners. This lack of internal control together with the poor management integrity 
associated with the agency problem will increase auditors' assessments of the control risk. 
This increase in control risk would translate into more audit hours or a large risk fee premium, 
increasing the total audit fee. We therefore test if, ceteris paribus, East Asian auditors charge 
their clients who have larger agency problems higher fees. Our formal (alternative) hypothesis 
is: 
H2: The audit fee charged to a firm is positively related to the firm's ultimate owner's ability to 
obtain effective control and/or the degree to which the control exceeds the ownership. 
Prior studies on audit fees have focused on examining how firm size or brand name (Simunic, 
1980; Francis, 1984), industry specialization (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995; DeFond, 
Francis, and Wong, 2000), and litigation risk (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Simunic and 
Stein, 1996) affect audit fees. There have been some recent studies that examine the relation 
between different corporate governance and audit fees. Carcello et al. (2000) document that 
a more independent, diligent, and expert board would demand greater external auditing and 
pay a higher audit fee. However, there may exist some underlying firm characteristics such 
as management entrenchment problems that raise the demand for high-quality boards and 
external audits, causing a spurious correlation. In another study using a sample of 67 Hong 
Kong listed firms, Gul, Tsui, and Chen (1998) document that family control is associated with 
lower audit fees. They interpret the result as being consistent with the view that family firms 
are subject to fewer agency problems than are non-family firms. Our study specifically tests 
if audit pricing is a function of the client firm's agency conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
Finally, we want to examine whether East Asian auditors would take into account a firm's 
agency problems before issuing the audit reports. More specifically, we test if low earnings 
are more likely to trigger modified opinions by auditors for client firms with larger agency 
problems than for client firms with smaller agency problems. There are two arguments that 
support this hypothesis. First, the loss exposure associated with the client firm's agency 
problems per se may be a small concern when the firm is profitable, but it will become more 
serious when the firm is in financial distress. When a firm approaches its terminal year, its 
controlling owner has greater incentive to expropriate outside shareholders as the benefits 
of maintaining a good reputation for future financing diminish. Thus, in bad times, the controlling 
owner is more prone to engage in self-interested behavior. Second, the controlling owner's 
entrenchment may weaken the ability of the firm to recover from poor performance, therefore 
increasing its bankruptcy risk. Therefore, if auditors serve as external monitors and take into 
account the risks associated with bankruptcy and the controlling owners' entrenchment, they 
will more likely give modified opinions to poorly performing firms with large agency problems. 
Our formal (alternative) hypothesis is: 
H3: Poor earnings will more likely trigger auditors to issue modified opinions to firms whose 
ultimate owners possess high degrees of control and achieve the control through less-than-
equivalent ownership investment. 
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Data sample 
Our primary data source is Worldscope. This database contains annual data regarding 
auditor names, audit fees, audit opinions, and financial information for listed companies from 
over 40 economies around the world. From the database, we select sample firms from eight 
East Asian economies — Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia; the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. We select 1994 through 1996 as the period of analysis. We do 
not include the post-1996 period in our study to avoid possible structural shifts after the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. We also exclude pre-1994 data because there are a great number of 
missing data in this earlier period. 
We need to identify the ultimate controlling owners of each firm and what share of the control 
and ownership rights they hold. For this ownership information, we refer to data assembled 
by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). Their ownership database traces the complex 
ownership structure and identifies the ultimate controlling owners of about 3,000 publicly 
traded corporations in nine East Asian economies as of 1996, including the eight economies 
we selected for the study. We merge the 1996 ownership data with the 1994-1996 audit and 
financial data because ownership of our sample firms was stable over the sample period. 
Basic statistics 
As shown in Table 1, our final sample consists of 3,119 firm-year observations from 1994 to 
1996. These observations all have auditor, ownership, and financial data that are required 
for constructing our empirical measures. Our final sample represents 28% of all the listed 
companies in the eight economies.10 The table shows that Big Five or Big Five-affiliated 
auditors dominate the auditing activities in the eight economies in our sample. Singapore 
has the highest percentage of Big Five or Big Five-affiliated auditors with 88.3%, followed by 
Indonesia with 87.7%, Hong Kong with 80.6%, Malaysia with 74%, South Korea with 71.4%, 
Thailand with 65.3%, the Philippines with 62.3% and Taiwan has the lowest percentage with 
56.1%. In this paper, we do not distinguish between Big Five auditors and Big Five-affiliated 
auditors. In Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, foreign accounting firms are not 
permitted to practice without partnering with local firms. All the Big Five auditors in these 
countries have joined up with large local firms to form Big Five-affiliated firms. The local firms 
provide valuable business contacts while the Big Five firms provide technical expertise and 
their international networks of member firms.11 
Not all the firms in Worldscope contain audit opinion information. The modified opinion in 
Worldscope includes disclaimer and adverse opinions, and it does not distinguish among 
the various types of modified opinions, such as asset realization, litigation, and going concern. 
Combining all these opinions into one should not create a bias in favor of our second 
hypothesis. In our sample, only 2,335 firm-year observations include an audit opinion. 
10
 As in year 1996, the percentages of companies represented in our sample are 37% for Hong Kong, 4 7% for Indonesia, 
20% for Malaysia, 33% for the Philippines, 22% for South Korea, 56% for Singapore, 13% for Taiwan and 18% for 
Thailand. 
11A case in point is the merger of Arthur Andersen and SyCip, Gorres, Velayo and Company (SVG) in the Philippines. 
SVG was a local firm set up by Washington SyCip in Manila in 1946. During our sample period of 1994 to 1996, Arthur 
Andersen merged with SVG, which explains why the percentage of market share for Big Five firms increased from 
19.2% to 87.7% in the Philippines during this period. 
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Table 2 presents the percentage of modified opinions by economy and by year in our sample.12 
On average, only two percent of the companies in our sample received a modified opinion. 
The percentage of modified opinions is highest in 1995 and lowest in 1994. In addition, the 
cross-economy distribution of modified opinions is uneven with Indonesia reporting no modified 
opinion, while Thailand reported 13.3% modified opinions from 1994 to 1996. 
Table 2 
Percentage of Modified Opinions by Economy and by Year3 
Economy 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
All Economies 
1994-1996b 
1.80 (8)c 
0.00 (0) 
0.65 (2) 
4.88 (6) 
0.92 (3) 
0.20(1) 
0.49(1) 
13.33(28) 
2.10(49) 
1994 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0) 
1.41 (1) 
7.14(2) 
0.00 (0) 
0.68(1) 
0.00 (0) 
3.85 (2) 
1.08(6) 
1995 
1.08(2) 
0.00 (0) 
0.95(1) 
4.17(2) 
0.79(1) 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0) 
19.74(15) 
2.50(21) 
1996 
3.33 (6) 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0) 
4.26 (2) 
1.48(2) 
0.00 (0) 
1.30(1) 
13.41 (11) 
2.35 (22) 
Sample: The sample consists of 2,335 firm-year observations of audit opinions from Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. These audit opinions, either clean or 
modified, for the sample firms in these eight economies from 1994 to 1996 are obtained from Worldscope. 
3
 The percentage of modified opinions is calculated based on the number of firm-years that received modified 
opinions divided by the total number of firm-years in the sample for the corresponding economy and year or 
years. 
b
 Pooled sample of data from 1994 to 1996. The other columns are based on sub-samples of each of the three 
years. 
c
 The actual numbers of modified opinions are in brackets. 
12
 For Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, the standards and format for audit reports 
generally follow those of the U.S. The standards and reporting format of audit reports in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore generally follow the international auditing guidelines. 
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Audit fees are not mandatorily disclosed except in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Thus, Worldscope contains audit fee data only for these three economies in our sample, 
comprising 1,304 firm-year observations. The mean and median audit fees of the three 
economies are reported in Table 3. The fee data show that Hong Kong firms spend the most 
in U.S. dollars and as a percentage of assets (reported in brackets) on audit services, while 
Malaysian firms incur the lowest fees for such services. 
Economy 
Hong Kong 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
All Three 
Economies 
Table 3 
Audit Fees by Economy and by Year 
1994-1996a 
Mean Median 
350.38 
(0.11)b 
130.30 
(0.04) 
206.71 
(0.11) 
243.92 
(0.09) 
200.67 
(0.09) 
50.38 
(0.02) 
132.90 
(0.07) 
138.12 
(0.05) 
1994 
Mean Median 
342.41 
(0.09) 
112.32 
(0.03) 
196.63 
(0.10) 
227.66 
(0.08) 
202.39 
(0.08) 
50.85 
(0.02) 
119.34 
(0.06) 
131.67 
(0.05) 
1995 
Mean Median 
337.53 
(0.11) 
111.28 
(0.03) 
193.77 
(0.11) 
232.62 
(0.09) 
195.78 
(0.09) 
49.20 
(0.02) 
124.82 
(0.07) 
135.76 
(0.06) 
1996 
Mean Median 
368.79 
(0.11) 
161.02 
(0.05) 
227.65 
(0.12) 
266.71 
(0.09) 
208.03 
(0.09) 
51.09 
(0.02) 
145.41 
(0.07) 
146.68 
(0.06) 
Sample: The sample consists of 1,304 firm-year observations of audit fees from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. The audit fee data for the sample firms in these three economies from 1994 to 1996 are obtained 
from Worldscope. 
3
 Pooled sample of data from 1994 to 1996. The other columns are based on sub-samples of each of the three 
years. 
b
 The audit fees reported are in U.S.$ (thousands). In brackets, the audit fee as a percentage of total assets is 
reported. 
Measuring the ultimate owners' control and ownership levels 
Most prior studies of ownership structure focus on immediate ownership, which constitutes 
common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions. Immediate ownership is not 
sufficient for characterizing the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms, as these 
firms are often associated with complicated indirect ownership. In contrast to these prior 
studies, we focus on ultimate ownership as identified in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
For a given firm, the ultimate owners and their share of control (voting) and ownership (cash 
flow) rights are identified. To make the distinction between voting and cash flow rights, firm-
specific information on pyramid structures and cross-holdings is required. 
The procedure for identifying the ultimate owners is similar to the one used by La Porta et al. 
(1999). An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who holds at least 5% of the voting 
rights of the company and who is not controlled by anybody else. To economize on the data 
collection task, tracing further voting control stops at 50% and the ultimate owner's voting 
rights level is set equal to 50% once we reach this level. This ceiling is reasonable because 
the ultimate owner unambiguously gains full control once 50% of the voting rights is secured. 
Although a company can have more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate 
M 
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owner. With the highest level of voting rights, the largest ultimate owner is more likely than 
smaller owners to be the controlling owner of the firm. 
For a given firm, an ultimate owner's voting control level is defined as the ownership stake at 
the weakest link along the control chains connecting the ultimate owner and the firm. The 
cash flow rights that support the control by the ultimate owner equal the sum of the products 
of the ownership stakes of affiliated firms from each control chain identified. 
Consistent with statistics reported by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Fan and 
Wong (2001), East Asian corporations exhibit high levels of concentration of control in our 
sample: the mean level of voting rights of the ultimate owner is 27%. This is in contrast to 
U.S. firms studied in most prior research, which are characterized by diffuse ownership and 
control. The highest mean control concentration is found in Thailand (35%), followed by 
Indonesia (34%), Hong Kong (29%), Malaysia (28%), Singapore (27%), Taiwan (19%), and 
South Korea (17%). The sample mean cash flow rights over voting rights (CV) of 0.87 indicates 
that there is a significant degree of divergence between the two rights. The mean CV ratios 
across the eight economies in ascending order are: Indonesia (0.79), Singapore (0.82), Taiwan 
(0.84), Malaysia (0.86), Hong Kong (0.88), South Korea (0.89), the Philippines (0.91) and 
Thailand (0.96).13 
13
 This is consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) that the top 20 largest firms in Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea 
have more concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures than those in the U.S. Among the top 20 largest firms, 
90% in Hong Kong, 85% in Singapore and 45% in South Korea are controlled by an ultimate owner with more than 20% 
of the voting rights, while only 20% in the U.S. have such level of ownership concentration. Also, none of the top 20 
U.S. firms have pyramid ownership structure, but a large portion of these top 20 East Asian firms do: 39% in Hong 
Kong, 41% in Singapore and 33% in South Korea. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
This section reports the results of our empirical tests on the determination of auditor choice, 
audit fees, and audit opinions. 
Auditor choice 
We test our first hypothesis that a firm's choice of auditor is related to the firm's ownership 
structure using the following pooled cross-sectional LOGIT regression model: 
AUDITORjt = a0 + a1 SIZEit + a2 LEVjt + a3 GROUPi + a4 PYRAMID; + a5 DEV. 
+ a6 CVj + a7 DEV*CV. + a8 fixed effects + uit 
where, for sample firm /, 
AUDITORn= 1 when the auditor is a Big Five (including affiliated) accounting firm at year t, 
and 0 otherwise; 
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t\ 
LEVit = the long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t; 
GROUPj = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMID. = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, 
and 0 otherwise; 
DEV= 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the 
firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; 
CV= the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; 
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years 
and economies; 
uit = an error term at year t. 
We include total assets and leverage in the model to control for client size and risk. In addition, 
GROUP and PYRAMID are used as a control for organizational complexity.14 Firms belonging 
to complex corporate groups are likely to have numerous related-party transactions, which 
complicate the earnings recognition and accounting consolidation processes. This is 
particularly the case for firms in the top layers of pyramids that have to incorporate earnings 
of their affiliated firms in the lower layers of pyramids.15 We expect that group firms and 
particularly firms in the top layers of pyramids have a stronger demand for Big Five auditors. 
The three ownership variables, DEV, CVand DEV*CVare our experimental variables. DEV 
is median-adjusted to net out economy level differences in voting control level. This adjustment 
can hopefully take into account some of the economy-by-economy variation in the minimum 
level of voting rights needed for effective control due to institutional differences. We regard a 
firm is likely to have an ultimate owner with effective control if his/her level of voting rights is 
14
 The information on pyramids is from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). The group affiliation information is from 
Claessens et al. (2000b), which includes 170 large corporate groups across the eight economies. Firms that are 
affiliated with small groups, i.e., outside the 170 groups, are treated as independent firms. Firms belonging to the same 
group do not always hire the same auditor, nor do they always hire auditors in the same class (Big Five or non-Big 
Five). Each group on average has four member firms (in our final sample) and hires two distinct Big Five auditors and 
one non-Big Five auditor. Fifty-five of the 170 groups hire at least one Big Five auditor and one non-Big Five auditor 
among their members. 
15
 Except for South Korea where consolidation of accounts from subsidiaries is required only in supplementary statements, 
all other economies in our sample require consolidation in the companies' primary financial statements. 
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higher than that of the economy median. To reject the null of H1, we should find that more 
firms with high control (DEV=1) and/or larger separation of control and ownership (C\/<1) 
hire Big Five auditors. Thus, we expect that the coefficient of DEV is positive and that the 
coefficients of CV and/or DEV*CV are negative. We include the interaction term DEV* CV 
because CV may have not effect on auditor choice if the ultimate owner does not have 
effective control of the firm (DEV=0). 
Before presenting our regression results, we compare each explanatory variable in year 
1996 between Big Five and the non-Big Five clients. The results presented in Table 4 show 
that the control concentration and the divergence between control and ownership rights are 
statistically significantly higher for Big Five clients than for non-Big Five clients based on the 
t-test for means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians, supporting the alternative of 
H1. In addition, there is a higher proportion of Big Five clients belonging to corporate groups 
based on the mean and median tests, suggesting that the demand for Big Five auditors is 
associated with group complexity. In terms of client size, Big Five clients have larger mean 
and median total assets but only the difference in the mean is statistically significant. However, 
the leverage and the proportion of firms at the bottom of the pyramids are not statistically 
different between the two groups. 
Table 4 
Comparison of Firm Characteristics between Big Five Clients and 
Non-Big Five Clients in Year 1996 
All firms3 Firms hiring Firms hiring T-statistics Z-statistics 
Big Five non-Big Five for the for the 
auditors6 auditors0 difference difference 
in meansd in medians'3 
TA 
LEV 
EV (%) 
CV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
Mean 
2,079 
0.14 
0.82 
0.87 
0.59 
0.37 
Median 
386 
0.11 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
Mean 
2,224 
0.14 
1.12 
0.86 
0.61 
0.38 
Median 
388 
0.10 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
Mean 
1,552 
0.14 
-0.28 
0.89 
0.54 
0.35 
Median 
363 
0.12 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.94* 
-0.10 
1.80* 
-2.38*** 
2.05** 
0.87 
0.75 
-1.35* 
1.44* 
-2.27** 
2.07** 
0.86 
Variable definitions: TA is total assets in millions of U.S. dollars; LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets; 
EV is the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm minus the median 
percentage of voting rights in the corresponding economy; CV is the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of 
the largest ultimate owner; GROUP = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMID = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise. 
Sample: The sample consists of 1,251 firms with financial, group and ownership data for 1996 from Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The 1996 financial 
data are obtained from Worldscope. The 1996 ultimate ownership and group data are obtained from Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
a
 All 1,251 firms in the sample. 
b
 980 firms are clients of Big Five or Big Five affiliated auditors. 
c
 271 firms are clients of non-Big Five auditors. 
d
 T-statistics for the difference in means between firms hiring Big Five or Big Five affiliated auditors vs. non-Big 
Five auditors. 
e
 Z-statistics for the difference in means between firms hiring Big Five or Big Five affiliated auditors vs. non-Big 
Five auditors. 
***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% in two-tailed test. 
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Table 5 presents the LOGIT regression results estimated for the pooled sample period from 
1994 to 1996 and separately in each of the three years. Fixed effects are included in the 
regressions where appropriate, but for simplicity they are not reported. The pooled time-
series results show that large firms are more likely to hire Big Five auditors. Also, DEV is 
positive and statistically significant, while DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant. 
This supports the alternative of H1 that the demand for Big Five auditors is positively associated 
with the degree of agency problems as captured by the controlling owners' ability to command 
effective control and the divergence of their control and ownership. Similar to the pooled 
time-series results, the coefficient of DEV is positive and significant, while DEV*CV is negative 
and statistically significant in the 1994 and 1995 regressions. In the 1996 regression, CV\s 
negative and significant while other ownership variables are not statistically significant. Taking 
both the pooled time-series and annual regression results together, the evidence is consistent 
with the alternative of H1 that East Asian firms with larger agency conflicts tend to hire Big 
Five auditors. 
Table 5 
LOGIT Regression Results for Auditor Choice3 
Intercept 
SIZE 
LEV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DEV 
CV 
DEV*CV 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
Chi-square 
Degrees of Freedom 
P-value 
1994-1996 
-0.11 
(-0.21) 
0.10*** 
(3.44) 
-0.05 
(-0.18) 
0.07 
(0.68) 
-0.24* 
(-1.81) 
1.18*** 
(2.77) 
-0.12 
(-0.37) 
-1.26*** 
(-2.67) 
0.06 
3119 
214.78 
22 
0.0001 
1994 
-0.12 
(-0.12) 
0.06 
(0.98) 
-0.06 
(-0.11) 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
-0.11 
(-0.40) 
1.39* 
(1.67) 
0.44 
(0.70) 
-1.73* 
(-1.85) 
0.12 
760 
108.77 
20 
0.0001 
1995 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(1.53) 
-0.18 
(-0.34) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
-0.13 
(-0.58) 
1.40** 
(2.00) 
0.23 
(0.41) 
-1.47* 
(-1.91) 
0.06 
1108 
69.92 
20 
0.0001 
1996 
0.58 
(0.65) 
0.14*** 
(2.86) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.45) 
-0.48** 
(-2.10) 
0.71 
(0.96) 
-1.01* 
(-1.70) 
-0.68 
(-0.84) 
0.07 
1251 
92.58 
20 
0.0001 
I 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 2 NO. 1, 2003 
Table 5 (continued) 
Model specification: AUDITORit = a0 + a1 SIZEit + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUPj + a4 PYRAMID,. + a5 DEV. + a6 CVi + a7 
DEV*CV.+ a8 fixed effects + uit 
Variable definitions: AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; LEVit = long-term debt divided by total 
assets at the end of year t; GROUP= 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMID; = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; 
DEVj = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the 
median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV. = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the 
largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar 
years and economies when appropriate. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,119 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. To be included in 
the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial data and its auditor identity from Worldscope, and its 
ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
aThe first LOGIT regression is run pooling across economies and years from 1994 to 1996. The other three 
LOGIT regressions are run annually pooling across economies. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
To further test the effect of agency conflicts between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders on the demand for Big Five auditors, we partition our sample by client size, 
profit and leverage. For a given ownership structure, we expect that the degree of agency 
conflicts is more severe in small, low-profit, or high-leverage firms. The entrenchment problem 
of the controlling owners is large when the expected loss from being detected is small. 
Controlling owners of firms that are smaller or are in financial distress are particularly prone 
to engage in self-interested behaviors at the expense of outside investors, as their expected 
loss of reputation and business is low. To be consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we 
should find that the hypothesized effects of effective control and divergence between control 
and ownership rights on auditor choice are stronger for small, low-profit, or high-leverage 
firms and weaker for larger, more profitable, and low-leverage firms. 
Table 6 reports the pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions partitioned by client profit, 
leverage, and size separately. The sample partition is based on the within-economy three-
year medians. For example, client firms are partitioned into the high (low) profit subgroup if 
their return on assets is higher than or equal to (lower than) the corresponding three-year 
median in the economy. The regression presented in Table 5 is re-estimated using the high 
and low profit subgroups separately. This procedure is repeated for leverage as measured 
by total liability over total assets and then for size as measured by total assets. The results 
show that DEV is positive and significant while DEV*CV is negative and significant in the 
small and the high-leverage firms but not in the large and the low-leverage firms, while these 
results are present in both the high and the low-profit samples. The evidence in Table 6 
suggests that audit client size and leverage can influence the sensitivity of the relation between 
auditor choice and the client's ownership structure.16 
16
 Another interpretation for the high-leverage sample result is that banks may require their clients with large agency 
problems to hire more reputable auditors to mitigate their agency problems. Since most long-term debt in East Asia is 
bank debt, high leverage may be a proxy for this demand from banks. 
9 
DO EXTERNAL AUDITORS PERFORM A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE IN EMERGING MARKETS? EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA 
Table 6 
LOGIT Regression Results of Auditor Choice by Profitability, Leverage, 
and Firm Size Partitions3 
Intercept 
SIZE 
LEV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DEV 
CV 
DEV*CV 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
Chi-square 
Degree of Freedom 
P-value 
Low 
profit 
firmsb 
1.20 
(1-57) 
0.05 
(1.27) 
-0.33 
(-0.81) 
0.13 
(0.91) 
-0.52*** 
(-2.80) 
1.19** 
(1.99) 
-0.13 
(-0.30) 
-1.69*** 
(-2.53) 
0.07 
1574 
122.51 
22 
0.0001 
High 
profit 
firm3 
-1.23 
(-1.50) 
0.17*** 
(3.30) 
0.27 
(0.65) 
-0.06 
(-0.40) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
1.48** 
(2.31) 
-0.06 
(-0.11) 
-1.23* 
(-1.74) 
0.09 
1545 
155.91 
22 
0.0001 
High 
leverage 
firmsb 
-0.38 
(-0.41) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.28* 
(1.66) 
-0.27 
(-1.29) 
1.79*** 
(2.54) 
0.34 
(0.67) 
-1.99*** 
(-2.54) 
0.09 
1166 
117.50 
22 
0.0001 
Low 
leverage 
firm8 
-2.25** 
(-2.17) 
0.37*** 
(5.62) 
-3.03*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.26 
(-1.49) 
0.18 
(0.78) 
0.47 
(0.66) 
-0.36 
(-0.62) 
-0.15 
(-0.19) 
0.10 
1172 
132.03 
22 
0.0001 
Small 
firmsb 
-0.57 
(-0.55) 
0.15* 
(1.87) 
0.30 
(0.79) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.15 
(-0.80) 
1.54*** 
(2.51) 
-0.30 
(-0.64) 
-1.63*** 
(-2.38) 
0.07 
1530 
114.19 
22 
0.0001 
Large 
firm5 
0.64 
(0.62) 
0.09 
(1.54) 
-0.55 
(-1.11) 
0.07 
(0.50) 
-0.43** 
(-2.24) 
1.00 
(1.62) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-1.05 
(-1.53) 
0.10 
1589 
174.19 
22 
0.0001 
Model specification: AUDITORit = a0 + a1 SIZEit + a2 LEVit + a3 GROUP; + a4 PYRAMID,. + a5 DEV. + a6 CV + a7 
DEV*CVi + a8 fixed effects + ujt 
Variable definitions: AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEjt = natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; LEVit = long-term debt divided by total 
assets at the end of year t; GROUPt = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMID;. = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; 
DEVt = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the 
median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV. = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the 
largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar 
years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,119 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. To be included in 
the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial data and its auditor identity from Worldscope, and its 
ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
3
 The LOGIT regressions are run pooling across economies and years from 1994 to 1996. 
b
 The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year is higher than or 
equal to (lower than) its corresponding three-year median of the economy. The partitioning variable for profitability 
is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm size is total assets. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
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To examine further if the reported effect of the agency problem on the demand for Big Five 
auditors clusters in particular economies, we re-estimate the LOGIT regression economy by 
economy. As shown in Table 7, the ownership results are consistent with the alternative of 
H1 in several economies, though not clustering in any single economy. The effect of 
concentration of ownership (DEV) on the demand for Big Five auditors is positive in Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The effect of CV\s negative for South Korea, while the 
joint effect of DEV and CV is negative for Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. It is 
interesting to note that the association between our measure of agency conflicts and the 
preference for Big Five auditors is also found in South Korea, where there are only Big Five-
affiliated auditors, suggesting that Big Five-affiliated auditors may also provide quality-
differentiated audits to mitigate agency problems. 
As a diagnostic check, we examine, economy by economy, whether the agency problem 
affects the choice between non-Big Five auditors and the Big Five auditor that has the largest 
market share in the economy. The market share of each Big Five auditor is computed based 
on the auditor's total number of clients divided by the number of listed firms in our sample.17 
If the Big Five market leader commands the best reputation in the economy, excluding Big 
Five non-market leaders from our economy-by-economy regressions would increase the 
power of the test. This conjecture is confirmed by our results that DEV is positive and significant 
in all the economies in our study but Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, while DEV*CV is 
negative and significant in all the economies but Indonesia and Thailand.18 The insignificant 
results in Indonesia and Thailand suggest that the choice of external auditors is insensitive 
to their firms' agency problem. One possible explanation is that external auditors may not be 
fulfilling a strong monitoring role in these two economies where the demand and supply of 
good quality auditors are the weakest.19 Since Indonesia and Thailand are considered to 
have weaker legal environments than the rest of the East Asian economies in our sample, 
the result here is consistent with Choi and Wong (2002) and Francis et al. (2002) that the 
demand for Big 5 service is lower among weak than strong legal environment countries. 
In summary, we find that East Asian corporations whose ultimate owners possess high voting 
control and have a large divergence of control and ownership rights are more likely to employ 
Big Five auditors. This result supports the view that external auditors mitigate the agency 
conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors in this region. However, the 
economy-by-economy results indicate that the choice of auditor is insensitive to the agency 
problem in Indonesia and Thailand, which may suggest that external auditors do not perform 
such a role in these economies. 
17
 We also consider Price Waterhouse, and Coopers and Lybrand as two separate firms in this analysis because they 
are not yet merged into one firm during our sample period. The results of treating these two firms as one or two 
separate firms are qualitatively similar. 
18
 This result also suggests that the insignificant coefficients of DEV and DEV*CV for Singapore in Table 7 are caused 
by the weak power of the test. Also, a firm-by-firm check reveals that among the sampled Singaporean firms, 21 firms 
hire local auditors. Of the 21 firms, 15 firms display control-ownership divergence (CV<1). However, only 6 of the 21 
firms display excess control (DEV=1) and only 3 firms display both excess control and control-ownership divergence to 
the point of serious agency conflicts. These statistics suggest that the overall agency problem of the firms that hire 
local auditors is not substantial enough to support the null ofH1. 
19
 A possible alternative explanation is that Big Five auditors are not better in quality in Indonesia and Thailand. 
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Table 7 
LOGIT Regression Results of Auditor Choice by Economy8 
Intercept 
SIZE 
LEV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DEV 
CV 
DEV*CV 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
Chi-square 
Degree of 
Freedom 
P-value 
Hong 
Kong 
3.57*** 
(2.35) 
-0.14** 
(-1.96) 
-0.15 
(-0.15) 
-0.61*** 
(-2.52) 
-1.06** 
(-1.98) 
2.86*** 
(3.11) 
-0.54 
(-0.46) 
-3.34*** 
(-3.27) 
0.08 
J 651 
54.63 
15 
0.0001 
Indonesia 
-0.71 
(-0.34) 
0.31** 
(2.10) 
0.46 
(0.34) 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.52 
(0.92) 
-1.78 
(-1.24) 
-1.45 
(-1.03) 
2.15 
(1.28) 
0.08 
309 
27.13 
15 
0.0001 
Malaysia 
3.54*** 
(2.42) 
-0.08 
(-1.08) 
0.69 
(0.73) 
0.57** 
(1-97) 
-0.74** 
(-2.08) 
7.77*** 
(2.77) 
0.32 
(0.36) 
-8.04*** 
(-2.75) 
0.09 
411 
39.07 
15 
0.0001 
The 
Philippines 
-1.91 
(-0.78) 
-0.29** 
(-1.97) 
1.13 
(0.62) 
1.01** 
(2.10) 
-0.88* 
(-1.88) 
10.24** 
(2.12) 
2.50** 
(2.00) 
-9.78** 
(-1.96) 
0.32 
204 
96.78 
15 
0.0001 
Singapore 
-7 -|4*** 
(-3.33) 
0.67*** 
(4.51) 
-3.68*** 
(-2.75) 
0.79 
(1.57) 
-0.82 
(-1.49) 
1.17 
(0.70) 
2.40*** 
(2.39) 
-2.36 
(-1.18) 
0.10 
410 
44.45 
15 
0.0001 
South 
Korea 
-5.22*** 
(-2.90) 
0.48*** 
(5.61) 
0.68 
(1.37) 
-0.15 
(-0.63) 
-0.48 
(-1.61) 
-1.01 
(-0.90) 
-3.65*** 
(-3.74) 
1.52 
(1.20) 
0.13 
591 
90.97 
15 
0.0001 
Taiwan 
-0.71 
(-0.35) 
0.11 
(1.02) 
-0.13 
(-0.08) 
0.16 
(0.52) 
0.13 
(0.25) 
-4.09 
(-1.60) 
-0.77 
(-0.63) 
3.73 
(1.34) 
0.12 
223 . 
29.96" 
15 
0.0001 
Thailand 
-1.37 
(-0.82) 
-0.04 
(-0.45) 
-0.52 
(-0.65) 
-0.14 
(-0.51) 
-0.38 
(-0.80) 
0.73 
(0.39) 
0.95 
(0.73) 
-1.03 
(-0.53) 
0.08 
320 
26.25 
15 
0.0001 
Model specification: AUDITORit = a0 + a1 SIZEjt + a2 LEVjt + a3 GROUP\ + a4 PYRAMIDj + a5 DEVj + a6 CV,+ a7 
DEV*CVi + a8 fixed effects + uit 
Variable definitions: AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZEjt = natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; LEVit = long-term debt divided by total 
assets at the end of year t; GROUP= 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMIDi = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; 
DEV; = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the 
median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the 
largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries and calendar 
years. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,119 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. To be included in 
the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial data and its auditor identity from Worldscope, and its 
ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
a
 The LOGIT regressions are run economy by economy pooling across years from 1994 to 1996. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
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Audit fee 
To test our second hypothesis that the audit fee reflects a client firm's agency problem, we 
run the following pooled time-series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression: 
FEEit =b0 + b1 SIZEit+ b2 ROAit + b3 LEVit + b4 CACLit + b8ARt + toa /A/V, 
+ fc7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9DEV.+ b10 CV. + b„ DEV*CVi 
+ b12 fixed effects + ujt 
where, for sample firm /, 
FEE.t = the natural log of total audit fees at year t\ 
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; 
ROAit - the net income divided by total assets at the end of year t\ 
LEVit = the long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t\ 
CACLit = the current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of year t; 
ARjt = the accounts receivable divided by total assets at the end of year t; 
INVit = inventory divided by total assets at the end of year t\ 
GROUP) = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; 
PYRAMIDj = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, 
and 0 otherwise; 
DEVj = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of 
the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; 
CVj = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; 
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years 
and economies; 
ujt = an error term at year t. 
Consistent with prior studies such as those by Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984), we use a 
number of variables to control for (1) loss exposure attributable to the audit and (2) loss risk 
borne by the auditor. The level of loss exposure is estimated by total asset size (SIZE), asset 
composition as measured by the percentage of inventory and accounts receivable in total 
assets (INVand AR), and organizational complexity. The literature typically uses the number 
of domestic and foreign subsidiaries as a proxy for organizational complexity, which is not 
available in Worldscope. However, the amount of audit effort should be associated with two 
of our organizational complexity variables: corporate group membership (GROUP) and if the 
firm is on the bottom of a stock pyramid (PYRAMID). We expect that the amount of 
consolidation work increases when the firm belongs to a corporate group (GROUP = 7) and 
is on the top layers of the stock pyramid with many subsidiaries (PYRAMID = 0). The loss 
risk borne by the auditor is represented by the auditee's liquidity ratio (CACL), debt-asset 
ratio (LEV) and profitability (ROA). 
Table 8 presents the pooled-economy and the economy-by-economy regression results for 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, where reporting of audit fees is mandatory. Consistent 
with prior research, the audit fee is significantly and positively related to loss exposure and 
audit risk. More specifically, consistent with the notion that the audit fee is a function of the 
complexity of the audit, the coefficients of auditee size, percentage of accounts receivable 
and inventory in total assets, and group affiliation are positive and statistically significant in 
the pooled-economy and economy-by-economy regressions, with the exception that the 
coefficient of INV, which is not statistically significant for Malaysia, and the coefficient of 
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GROUP, which is not statistically significant for Hong Kong. In addition, audit risk as proxied 
by the auditee's ROA is significantly negatively related to the audit fee in the pooled-economy 
regression, as well as in the Hong Kong and Malaysia regressions. 
Consistent with the alternative of H1, we find that the coefficient of DEV is positive and 
statistically significant and the coefficient of DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant 
in the pooled regression as well as in the Hong Kong and Singapore regressions. When the 
pooled-economy regression is run separately using Big Five and non-Big Five samples, the 
coefficient of DEV is significantly positive and the coefficient of DEV*CV is significantly negative 
only in the Big Five regression. This suggests that Big Five auditors charge a premium to 
firms with agency problems as captured by the ownership variables, but non-Big Five auditors 
do not. Thus, pooling Big Five and non-Big Five clients in our regression weakens the 
ownership results. 
Intercept 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
CACL 
AR 
INV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DEV 
CV 
DEV*CV 
Adjusted R2 
Observations 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Pooled 
sample3 
-2.44*** 
(-9.29) 
0.59*** 
(39.03) 
-0.75*** 
(-4.47) 
0.09 
(0.56) 
-0.03 
(-1.32) 
1.04*** 
(6.92) 
1.01*** 
(6.40) 
0.11*** 
(2.36) 
-0.09 
(-1.52) 
0.30** 
(1.96) 
0.21 
(1.48) 
-0.31* 
(-1.78) 
0.68 
1304 
Hong 
Kongb 
-1.67*** 
(-3.45) 
0.52*** 
(21.37) 
-0.69*** 
(-3.80) 
0.54** 
(2.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
0.82*** 
(3.72) 
1.00*** 
(4.51) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(-0.67) 
0.47* 
(1.82) 
0.12 
(0.36) 
-0.47* 
(-1.69) 
0.54 
534 
Table 8 
Regression 
Malaysia0 
-4.00*** 
(-7.58) 
0.65*** 
(21.59) 
-0.84* 
(-1.79) 
-0.08 
(-0.29) 
-0.08** 
(-2.07) 
1.03*** 
(3.49) 
0.40 
(1.19) 
0.17* 
(1.86) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-1.02*** 
(-2.76) 
0.17 
(0.58) 
1 14*** 
(2.71) 
0.64 
369 
Results of Audit Fee 
Singapored 
-2.99*** 
(-6.45) 
0.59*** 
(20.37) 
-0.81 
(-1.57) 
0.34 
(1.16) 
0.02 
(0.55) 
0.85*** 
(2.99) 
1.45*** 
(4.76) 
0.20** 
(2.00) 
-0.26*** 
(-2.54) 
0.91*** 
(2.71) 
0.28 
(1.42) 
-1.06*** 
(-2.63) 
0.56 
401 
Firms hiring 
Big Five 
auditors6 
-2.27*** 
(-6.92) 
0.59*** 
(31.55) 
-1.14*** 
(-5.67) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(-1.36) 
0.93*** 
(5.14) 
1.38*** 
(6.82) 
0.14*** 
(2.54) 
-0.13 
(-1.62) 
0.40** 
(2.11) 
0.18 
(0.96) 
• -0.40* 
(-1.85) 
0.67 
889 
Firms hiring 
non-Big Five 
auditors' 
-3.08*** 
(-4.33) 
0.64*** 
(15.45) 
-0.26 
(-0.61) 
0.16 
(0.34) 
0.10* 
(1.70) 
0.84** 
(2.17) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(-0.37) 
-0.09 
(-0.58) 
-0.17 
(-0.39) 
0.18 
(0.57) 
0.14 
(0.29) 
0.74 
179 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Model specification: FEEit = b0 + bfilZE^ + b2 ROAjt + b3 LEVjt + b4 CACLit + b5ARjt + b6INVit + b7 GROUP + bd 
PYRAMID + b? DEVi + b10 CV. + b„ DEVfCV. + bjflxed effects + uit 
Variable definitions: FEEit = natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZEjt = natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; ROAit = net income divided by total assets at the end of year t; LEVit 
= long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t; CACLjt = current assets divided current liabilities at 
the end of year t; ARit = accounts receivable divided total assets at the end of year t; INVjt = inventory divided 
total assets at the end of year t; GROUPj - 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 
otherwise; PYRAMID. = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 
otherwise; DEVS = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm 
exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CVj = the ratio of cash flow rights to 
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of 
industries, calendar years and .economies when appropriate. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not 
reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 1,304 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. To be included in the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial 
data and audit fee from Worldscope, and its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000). 
a
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the entire sample of 1,304 firm-year 
observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering the three economies. 
b
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the Hong Kong sample of 534 firm-year 
observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996. 
c
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the Malaysia sample of 369 firm-year 
observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996. 
d
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the Singapore sample of 401 firm-year 
observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996. 
e
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the Big Five clients of 889 firm-year 
observations in the sample, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering the three economies. 
f
 This is a pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regression that uses the non-Big Five clients of 179 firm-year 
observations in the sample, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering the three economies. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
We note that the coefficients of DEV and DEV*CV for Malaysia are statistically significant 
but with opposite signs to those of Hong Kong and Singapore. This suggests that Hong 
Kong and Singapore auditors charge a premium while Malaysian auditors charge a discount, 
if the controlling owner of the client firm possesses effective control and has a large divergence 
between control and ownership. Regulations in the audit market may explain why audit fees 
in Malaysia fail to reflect agency problems as predicted by the positive view.20 In contrast to 
Hong Kong and Singapore, where the auditor markets are more internationalized and less 
regulated, Malaysia has an emerging audit market subject to fee regulations, which may 
give rise to the different fee structure. There is a smaller presence of Big Five auditors in 
Malaysia as is evident in our sample in which the average Big Five market share for Malaysia 
is 74%, which is significantly less than for Hong Kong with 80.6% and for Singapore with 
88.3% (Table 1). This lower demand for quality auditors could be driven by the Malaysian 
government's policies that discourage international investors' involvement in its stock market21. 
This is consistent with the results in Table 3 that Malaysian corporations incur the least in 
both dollar value and percentage of total assets of audit fees. Also consistent with the effect 
of the fee regulation, we find that Big Five auditors charge a fee premium in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, but not in Malaysia, which is also documented by Simon et al. (1992). 
20
 Fee regulation is not uncommon in East Asia. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants sets fee guidelines for their 
members. The Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants also sets fee guidelines based on clients' total asset 
size. 
21
 Malaysia has a 30% limit on the total direct investment by foreign individuals and institutions in a company. Singapore 
has some limits on foreign direct investment only in strategic industries, while Hong Kong does not have any restrictions. 
Also, foreign securities firms can only operate as joint venture firms with local partners in Malaysia. There is no such 
requirement in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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As in the previous auditor choice analysis, we perform a further regression analysis of audit 
fees using sub-samples partitioned by profit, size, and leverage. In Table 9, we find that the 
coefficient of DEVis significantly positive for low profit, small, and high-leverage clients. The 
coefficient of DEV*CV is significantly negative in the regressions for small and high-leverage 
clients. In contrast, none of the coefficients of the ownership variables is statistically 
significantly different from zero for high-profit, large, or low-leverage clients. Overall, these 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that audit fee premiums reflect the degrees of 
agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. 
Table 9 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results of Audit Fee by Profitability, Leverage, and 
Firm Size Partitions3 
Intercept 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
CACL 
AR 
INV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DEV 
CV 
DEV*CV 
Adjusted R2 
Observations 
Low profit 
firmsb 
-2.13*** 
(-5.58) 
0.60*** 
(27.34) 
-0.80*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.26 
(-1.40) 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
1.50*** 
(6.75) 
0.37 
(1.62) 
0.01* 
(0.08) 
-0.17** 
(-1.94) 
0.38* 
(1.67) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.38 
(-1.49) 
0.70 
591 
High profit 
firms 
-2.53*** 
(-6.65) 
0.58*** 
(26.62) 
-0.48* 
(-1.66) 
0.74*** 
(2.84) 
-0.03 
(-1.26) 
0.63*** 
(3.06) 
1.56*** 
(7.17) 
0.16*** 
(2.62) 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
0.27 
(1.24) 
0.31 
(1.43) 
-0.28 
(-1.14) 
0.68 
713 
High leverage 
firmsb 
-2.02*** 
(-5.40) 
0.60*** 
(26.47) 
-0.43* 
(-1.77) 
-0.08 
(-0.44) 
-0.08 
(-1.63) 
0.61*** 
(2.90) 
0.33 
(1.52) 
0.12* 
(1.93) 
-0.19** 
(-2.31) 
0.50** 
(2.26) 
0.33* 
(1.78) 
-0.61*** 
(-2.45) 
0.65 
658 
Low leverage 
firms 
-2.96*** 
(-8.00) 
0.61*** 
(29.47) 
-1.07*** 
(-4.60) 
-0.25 
(-0.66) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
1.21*** 
(4.39) 
1.94*** 
(7.12) ' 
0.10* 
(1.65) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
0.20 
(0.93) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
0.73 
646 
Small 
firmsb 
-2.10*** 
(-5.03) 
0.56*** 
(18.01) 
-0.48*** 
(-2.73) 
0.19 
(1.05) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.27) 
0.46*** 
(2.65) 
•
 0i89*** 
(4.89) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.49*** 
(2.54) 
0.31 
(1.62) 
-0.47** 
(-2.14) 
0.67 
740 
Large firms 
-3.07*** 
(-5.56) 
0.65*** 
(19.05) 
-1.41*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.22 
(-0.89) 
0.04 
(1.31) 
1.89*** 
(6.62) 
1.24*** 
(4.26) 
0.09 
(1.23) 
-0.16 
(-1.55) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.19 
(0.91) 
-0.20 
(-0.71) 
0.56 
564 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Model specification: FEEit = b0 + b.SIZE^ + b2 ROAit + b3 LEVit + b4 CACLjt + b5ARit + b6INVit + b7 GROUP + b8 
PYRAMID + b9 DEVt + b10 CVi + b„ DEV*CVt + b12 fixed effects + uit 
Variable definitions: FEEjt - natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; ROAit = net income divided by total assets at the end of year t; LEVn 
= long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t; CACLit = current assets divided current liabilities at 
the end of year t; ARit = accounts receivable divided total assets at the end of year t; INVit = inventory divided 
total assets at the end of year t; GROUPj = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 
otherwise; PYRAMID. = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 
otherwise; DEVt = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm 
exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV. = the ratio of cash flow rights to 
voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of 
industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 1,304 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. To be included in the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial 
data and audit fee from Worldscope, and its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000). 
a
 The OLS regressions are run pooling across ecdnomies and years from 1994 to 1996. 
b
 The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year is higher than or 
equal to (lower than) its corresponding three-year median of the economy. The partitioning variable for profitability 
is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm size is total assets. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
In summary, the results from the audit fee analysis show that in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
auditors, specifically Big Five auditors, charge a premium for clients' agency problems as 
measured by their ultimate owners' control concentration and separation of control and 
ownership. This lends further support for the view that auditors alleviate agency conflicts in 
East Asia. 
Audit opinion 
Finally, to test our last hypothesis that low earnings will more likely trigger a modified opinion 
for firms with large agency problems than for firms with small agency problems, we run the 
following pooled time-series cross-sectional LOGIT regression: 
OPINION, = b0 + b.SIZE,* b2ROAit+ b3LEVit + b4CACLit+ b^Rit + bJNV, 
+b7 GROUP + b8 PYRAMID + b9 DCVi + b10 DCV*ROAjt 
+ fixed effects + u., 
where, for sample firm i and year t, 
OPINION\= 1 when it is a modified opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
DCVjt = 1 when the ultimate control exceeds ownership rights (CV jt < 7), and 0 otherwise; 
and the other variables are defined earlier. 
In this analysis, we use only a dummy variable, DCV, to capture agency conflicts. As there 
are a total of only 49 modified opinions in the sample, employing both of the ownership 
variables is implausible. We also do not include lagged opinions as independent variables 
because that would further reduce the number of modified opinions in each of our sample 
years. 
The regression results presented in Table 10 suggest that the modified opinions are 
significantly negatively associated with firm profitability (ROA) for the whole sample and for 
both the Big Five and non-Big Five client samples. However, the other audit risk variables, 
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CACL and LEV, cannot significantly explain audit opinions, with the exception that LEV is 
positively associated with modified opinions in the non-Big Five regression. This is consistent 
with the audit fee results that among the audit risk variable, only ROA is significantly negatively 
associated with audit fees. The asset composition and organization complexity variables 
seem to give surprising results. The coefficients of GROUP and AR are negative and 
statistically significant in all three regressions, differing from prior predictions. Membership 
in a corporate group may reduce the propensity for getting modified opinions if group firms 
manage to reduce bankruptcy risk using related-party transactions as cross-subsidies. Also, 
ROA is positively correlated with AR, which may have induced multicollinearity between the 
two variables. Consistent with this conjecture, when the regression is separately estimated 
using high and low profitability samples, a procedure used in the auditor choice and audit fee 
regressions, the coefficient of AR becomes statistically insignificant in both samples. Finally, 
the coefficient of DCV*ROA is negative and statistically significant for the whole sample and 
the Big Five sample regressions, but not for the non-Big Five sample regressions. 
The whole sample and the Big Five sample results are consistent with H3 that low earnings 
would more easily trigger a modified opinion for auditees with divergence of control and 
ownership. When taking the audit fee and opinion results together, we find that Big Five 
auditors take into consideration their auditee's ownership structure in setting audit prices 
and issuing modified opinions, while non-Big Five auditors do not. 
Since Table 2 shows that modified opinions are not evenly distributed across the economies, 
we perform two diagnostic analyses. We repeat the regressions in Table 10 by dropping 
Indonesia, which had no modified opinion from 1994 to 1996, and the results remain 
qualitatively the same. In addition, Table 2 shows that in 1995 and 1996, there were 
considerably more modified opinions in Thailand with 15 (19.7%) in 1995 and 11 (13.4%) in 
1996. The regression results in Table 10 also remain unchanged when both Indonesia and 
Thailand are dropped from the sample. 
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Table 10 
Logit Regression Results of Audit Opinion 
Intercept 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
CACL 
AR 
INV 
GROUP 
PYRAMID 
DCV 
DCV*ROA 
Pseudo R2 
Observations 
Chi-square 
Degree of Freedom 
P-value 
Pooled 
sample3 
-5.35*** 
(-2.68) 
0.08 
(0.56) 
-6.73*** 
(-4.96) 
-1.11 
(-1.23) 
-0.03 
(-0.67) 
-3.94** 
(-2.30) 
-0.84 
(-0.62) 
-1.00*** 
(-2.41) 
0.51 
(0.85) 
-0.69 
(-1.02) 
-9.86*** 
(-2.76) 
0.07 
2335 
173.55 
25 
0.0001 
Firms hiring 
BigFive 
auditors'3 
-4.52* 
(-1.73) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-6.26*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.63 
(-1.36) 
-0.02 
(-0.43) 
-3.48* 
(-1.72) 
0.21 
(0.11) 
-1.61*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.19 
(-0.24) 
0.42 
(0.54) 
-9.68*** 
(-2.69) 
0.06 
1758 
115.39 
25 
0.0001 
Firms hiring 
non-Big Five 
auditors0 
-5.72 
(-0.67) 
-0.59 
(-1.16) 
-19.98** 
(-2.02) 
7.64* 
(1.84) 
-0.10 
(-0.58) 
4.44 
(-0.84) 
3.70 
(1.17) 
-2.37* 
(-1.89) 
2.81* 
(1.79) 
-8.63 
(-0.17) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
0.14 
577 
96.43 
25 
0.0001 
Model specification: OPINION\ = b0 + b^IZE^ + b2ROAit + b3LEVit + b4CACLjt + b^AR^ + b6INVit +b7 GROUP + 
b8 PYRAMID + b9 DCVt + b10 DCVi *ROAit + fixed effects + ujt 
Variable definitions: OPINIONjt = 1 when it is a modified opinion, and 0 otherwise; SIZEit = natural logarithm of 
total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at the end of year t; ROAit = net income divided by total assets at the end 
of year t; LEVjt = long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t; CACLjt = current assets divided 
current liabilities at the end of year t; ARit = accounts receivable divided total assets at the end of year t; INVjt = 
inventory divided total assets at the end of year t; GROUPi = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate 
group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID; = 1 when the client firm is in the bottom of the pyramid, and 0 otherwise; 
DCVj = 1 when the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is less than 1, and 0 
otherwise; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and 
economies; For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. 
Sample: The sample includes 2,335 firm-year observations, spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. To be included in 
the sample, a firm must have at least one year of financial data and an audit opinion from Worldscope, and its 
ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). 
a
 This is a LOGIT regression that uses the entire sample of 2,335 firm-year observations, spanning between 
1994 and 1996 covering the eight economies. 
b
 This is a LOGIT regression that uses the Big Five clients of 1,758 firm-year observations in the sample, 
spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering the eight economies. 
c
 This is a LOGIT regression that uses the non-Big Five clients of 577 firm-year observations in the sample, 
spanning between 1994 and 1996 covering the eight economies. 
***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 
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In summary, the results from the audit opinion regressions indicate that Big Five auditors in 
East Asia are more stringent on clients with agency problems. This evidence corroborates 
earlier fee premium results that Big Five auditors fulfill the monitoring role by exerting greater 
auditing effort on firms subject to agency conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
The concentrated ownership of East Asian corporations gives rise to conflicts of interest 
between controlling owners and minority shareholders. One big concern about containing 
the controlling owners' self-interested activities is that conventional internal and external 
governance mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeover markets are typically 
weak when corporate ownership is concentrated as in East Asia. To mitigate this agency 
problem, theory suggests that the controlling owners may find ways to employ credible bonding 
mechanisms to assure the minority shareholders that their interests would be protected. We 
examine if external independent auditors play this role in East Asia. 
We find that in East Asia, firms subject to greater agency conflicts, indicated by their high 
control concentration and a large separation of control and ownership, are more likely to hire 
Big Five auditors than firms subject to less agency problems. We further find that the auditee's 
ownership structure is associated with its choice of auditor only among small and high-risk 
auditees, whose threat of expropriation by ultimate owners is high, but not among large and 
low-risk auditees whose threat of expropriation is low. Our results also show that Big Five 
auditors take into consideration their auditees' ownership structure when making pricing and 
opinion decisions, while non-Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors 
charge a fee premium to clients with controlling owners who enjoy effective control but actually 
owning a small stake in the firm. Also, poor earnings can more likely trigger Big Five auditors 
to issue a modified opinion of their clients with large agency problems, which suggests that 
Big Five auditors lower the modification threshold as their clients' agency problems increase. 
The overall evidence lends support to the agency theory and suggests that auditors play a 
crucial monitoring role to mitigate agency problems in emerging markets. 
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking the corporate 
ownership structure with mandatory external audits in the context of emerging markets. It 
provides evidence of how firms' agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
affect their choice of auditors and of the auditors' decisions on audit fees and audit opinions. 
Analyzing auditor types, fees and opinions allows us to use these quantifiable measures to 
capture the quality of a corporate governance mechanism used by a firm. From the policy 
perspective, this study sheds light on the question of whether or not voluntary governance 
mechanisms were at work prior to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Future research could examine other corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets. 
Potential candidates could include institutional owners, financial analysts, and prominent 
directors. Such research will not only complement existing research that mostly focuses on 
developed economies but also provide policy suggestions to firms and governments in 
emerging markets that are striving to reform their corporate governance. 
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